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Abstract— In this paper, we show how behaviour trees (BTs)
can be used to design modular, versatile, and robust control
architectures for mission-critical systems. In particular, we show
this in the context of autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs).
Robustness, in terms of system safety, is important since manual
recovery of AUVs is often extremely difficult. Further more,
versatility is important to be able to execute many different
kinds of missions. Finally, modularity is needed to achieve a
combination of robustness and versatility, as the complexity of
a versatile systems needs to be encapsulated in modules, in
order to create a simple overall structure enabling robustness
analysis. The proposed design is illustrated using a typical AUV
mission.
Index Terms— robotic planning, behaviour trees, artificial
intelligence, autonomous underwater vehicles
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the limitation in communication bandwidth and
range, Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs), such as
the one in Figure 1, cannot rely on tele-operation solutions
in the same way that aerial and ground-based robots do [1].
Furthermore, the areas of operation of AUVs are often
remote and hard to access by other means, making recovery
of a malfunctioning AUV very difficult and costly [2]. For
these reasons, the AUV control system needs to be both
robust, to prevent the loss of vehicles, and versatile, to
autonomously handle many different situations, see e.g., [3],
on its own. These requirements lead to a trade-off in the
complexity of the system, as robustness is often achieved by
simplicity while versatility leads to complex systems. With
this contribution we show how Behaviour Trees (BTs) can
be used to design highly modular, versatile as well as robust,
control architectures for AUVs.
BTs were invented in the computer game industry as a way
to design complex, but modular, AI for in-game opponents
[4], [5], [6]. Since then, they have been shown to generalise
a significant set of popular robotic control architectures,
including Finite State Machines, Decision Trees, the Sub-
sumption Architecture and the Teleo-reactive approach [7],
[8]. BTs have also been successfully used in the context
of machine learning [9], [10], [11], training by demonstra-
tion [12], collaborative assembly robotics, [13] and surgical
robotics [14].
The authors are with the Robotics, Perception and Learning
Lab. (RPL), School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sci-
ence, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), SE-100 44 Stock-
holm, Sweden, and with the Marine Autonomous and Robotic Sys-
tems at the National Oceanography Centre, Southampton, SO14
3ZH, United Kingdom. e-mail: {sprague|ozero|petter}@kth.se
{andmun|raclow|abp}@noc.ac.uk
Fig. 1: The National Oceanography Centre’s Autosub Long
Range 6000 AUV, prior to deployment under the Filchner-
Ronne Ice Shelf in Antarctica.
II. BACKGROUND
It this section we give a brief description of BTs, but refer
the interested reader to [15] for more details.
At the core, BTs are built from a small set of simple
components, but just as many other powerful concepts, these
components can be combined to create very rich structures.
Formally speaking, a BT is an acyclic directed graph (a
tree) composed of nodes and edges. The nodes of the tree can
be divided into six categories, Fallback, Sequence, Parallel,
Action, Condition, Decorator, as listed in Table I.
With the standard meaning of child and parent in the
tree context, the non-parent nodes are the interfaces to the
physical AUV in terms of either Actions, where typically the
AUV actuators are given commands, or Condition, where
typically a condition is checked based on sensor data. All
parent nodes of the tree are of the types Fallback, Sequence,
Parallel, and Decorator, and are used to decide what Actions
to execute, based on both Conditions and the outcomes
of other Actions. A BT is executed by regularly sending
Ticks to the root node. This is done with a user defined
frequency, chosen depending on how fast the system should
be able to react and how much computing power is available.
When a node is ticked, it either forwards the tick to one
of its children, as explained below, or does some type
of computation, typically involving sensor data if it is a
condition, or the transmission of commands to the actuators
of the system if it is an action. We will now describe all
node types in more detail.
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The Sequence node executes Algorithm 1, which corre-
sponds to routing the Ticks to its children from the left
until it finds a child that returns either Failure or Running,
then it returns Failure or Running accordingly to its own
parent. It returns Success if and only if all its children return
Success. Note that when a child returns Running or Failure,
the Sequence node does not route the Ticks to the next child
(if any). The Sequence node is drawn using the symbol “→”,
as shown in Figure 2.
→
Action	1
Action	2
...
Action	N
Fig. 2: Graphical representation of a Sequence node with N
children.
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode of a Sequence node with N
children
1 Function Tick()
2 for i← 1 to N do
3 childStatus ← child(i).Tick()
4 if childStatus = Running then
5 return Running
6 else if childStatus = Failure then
7 return Failure
8 return Success
The Fallback node1 executes Algorithm 2, which corre-
sponds to routing the Ticks to its children from the left
until it finds a child that returns either Success or Running.
It then returns, accordingly, Success or Running to its own
parent. It returns Failure if and only if all its children return
Failure. Note that when a child returns Running or Success,
the Fallback node does not route the Ticks to the next child
(if any). The Fallback node is drawn using the symbol “?”,
as shown in Figure 2.
The Parallel node executes Algorithm 3, which corre-
sponds to ticking all of its children. The return status is
then given by an aggregate of the return status of the
children. Given a parameter M ≤ N, where N is the number
of children, it returns Success if at least M children have
succeeded, Failure if enough have failed to make the above
impossible, and Running otherwise.
When an Action node receives Ticks, it executes a com-
mand, as in Algorithm 4. It returns Success if the action is
successfully completed or Failure if the action has failed.
While the action is ongoing it returns Running.
1Fallback nodes are sometimes also called selector or priority selector
nodes.
?
Action	1
Action	2
...
Action	N
Fig. 3: Graphical representation of a Fallback node with N
children.
Algorithm 2: Pseudocode of a Fallback node with N
children
1 Function Tick()
2 for i← 1 to N do
3 childStatus ← child(i).Tick()
4 if childStatus = Running then
5 return Running
6 else if childStatus = Success then
7 return Success
8 return Failure
When a Condition node receives Ticks, it checks a con-
dition, as in Algorithm 5. It returns Success or Failure
depending on if the condition holds or not. Note that a
Condition node never returns the status Running.
The Decorator node is a control flow node with a single
child that manipulates the return status of its child according
to a user-defined rule and also selectively Ticks the child
according to some predefined rule. For example, a Max 10
sec decorator can start an internal timer the first time it is
ticked, it then ticks its child and returns the corresponding
return status for up to 10 seconds. After that it does not tick
its child, but instead directly returns Failure, thus effectively
limiting the execution time of its child to 10 seconds. Other
examples of decorators are the invert decorator that always
ticks its child, but swaps Success/Failure in the return status.
For a more thorough description of BTs we refer the reader
to the references given above.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A typical AUV deployment is illustrated in Figure 4,
and such missions are indicative of ship based deployments
of AUVs [16]. The example assumes Wi-Fi and/or Iridum
communication between the operator and the AUV while it is
on the surface. Whilst submerged we assume low bandwidth
acoustic communications enabling the operator to upload
simple commands or new mission tasks (e.g., waypoints) and
download basic diagnostic information. In this example the
mission consists of six possible phases:
• Transit away from the ship - initial phase where the
AUV moves to a safe stand-off distance from the launch
vessel and waits for an operator go command prior to
diving.
Algorithm 3: Pseudocode of a Parallel node with N
children and success threshold M
1 Function Tick()
2 forall i← 1 to N do
3 childStatus[i] ← child(i).Tick()
4 if Σi:childStatus[i]=Success1= N then
5 return Success
6 else if Σi:childStatus[i]=Failure1> 0 then
7 return Failure
8 else
9 return Running
Algorithm 4: Pseudocode of an Action node
1 Function Tick()
2 ExecuteCommand()
3 if action-succeeded then
4 return Success
5 else if action-failed then
6 return Failure
7 else
8 return Running
• Dive and hold at depth - the AUV dives, conducts
in water calibration(s) (e.g. compass) and turns on
payload(s) transits to a target depth and location while
being monitored acoustically. The AUV waits for an
acoustic command to continue.
• Primary survey - the vehicle navigates between a series
of waypoints sequentially, often resulting in a lawn-
mower pattern, while maintaining a constant water depth
or altitude from the seabed.
• Alternative survey - triggered either by an acoustic
operator command or by a sensor reading the AUV may
be tasked to undertake a secondary survey;
• Surface and recovery - the final mission phase where
the AUV returns to the surface, turns off payloads and
is recovered from the water.
• Abort in the event of unexpected anomalies (e.g. a
detected leak) the vehicle will undertake an abort be-
haviour. In open ocean this involves dropping a weight
while the AUV attempts to surface. When operating
under ice more complex contingency behaviours are
required. Such anomalous events include: over depth
condition, under altitude condition, leak detected, pro-
peller stuck detected, actuator stuck detected etc.
With the example mission structure in mind, we now
consider what properties we want the AUV control system to
exhibit. In general, the system should try to satisfy the fol-
lowing properties, or exhibit the corresponding behaviours,
in the given order of priority. The AUV should:
1) Maintain the safety of the AUV - the AUV should abort
Algorithm 5: Pseudocode of a Condition node
1 Function Tick()
2 if condition-true then
3 return Success
4 else
5 return Failure
Node type Symb. Succeeds if Fails if Running if
Fallback ? one child succ. all ch. fail 1 ret. Running
Sequence → all ch. succ. one ch. fails 1 ret. Running
Parallel ⇒ ≥M ch. succ. > N−M ch. fail else
Action text Succeeded Failed else
Condition
  text If true If false Never
Decorator ♦ Custom Custom Custom
TABLE I: The node types of a BT. See the detailed descrip-
tion for an explanation of the abbreviations used.
Fig. 4: A typical AUV survey mission.
the mission in case of high risk anomalies (e.g. leaks,
propeller stuck etc.) but also avoid obstacles appearing
in its path and maintain a safe clearance from the
seabed.
2) Wait for operator clearance - specific phases of the
mission should only start following a command from
the operator. E.g. the primary survey should only
start on receipt of a continue acoustic command from
the operator indicating the system is fully prepared
(e.g. payloads on and functioning correctly). This is
particularly relevant for high risk operations e.g. under
ice or in deep water where initial monitoring of the
system is recommended to mitigate the risk of vehicle
loss [17].
3) Keep Mission tasks synchronised - the mission tasks
(e.g. survey route) is updated in relation to the ob-
jectives of the operators and/or acquired sensor data
[18], [19]. If the operator requires a task update,
communications is necessary [20].
4) Finalise the Mission - return to the surface, turn
payload(s) off and await recovery.
Considering the system’s properties, two sets of overall
conditions and actions, as well as their pairings (behaviours),
are generated, which will form the building blocks with
which the eventual BT will be built. We will see that,
although some conditions and actions are repeated among
the set of behaviours, it will not result in redundant code,
as a key practical benefit of using behaviour trees is their
accommodation of reusing actions in several places in the
tree.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Ø →
?
safe?
safety	action
?
continue	command?
prepare	system
?
mission	synchronised?
synchronise	mission
?
mission	complete?
execute	mission
?
finalised?
finalise
Safety
System	preparation
Mission	synchronisation
Mission	execution
Mission	finalisation
Fig. 5: General mission critical system BT. Note the modular
structure that will be expanded in Figure 6. Robustness is
achieved by always checking the safety condition and taking
appropriate actions when needed.
Given the general mission properties outlined above, we
create the general BT shown in Figure 5. As can be seen,
the BT closely follows the list of desired properties of the
system. First it checks is the system is safe, if not it performs
a safety action. If safe, it goes on to check if a continue
command has been issued, if not it executes the system
preparations. If ordered to continue, it checks if the mission
is synchronised with received updates and sensor data, if
not it updates its mission. If synchronised, it checks if the
mission is complete, if not it goes on to execute the mission.
If the mission is complete it finalises the mission e.g., by
turning off payloads and returning to the surface.
Note that all these checks are carried out with the fre-
quency of the BT, making the system react immediately
to a non safe situation, or new waypoints being received.
This construction of combining a condition with the action
needed to satisfy the condition is a simple version of the the
postcondition-precondition-action (PPA) structure, described
in [15].
Now we can refine the general BT given in Figure 5 to
capture the details of the mission outlined in Figure 4. We
want to add the following details to the BT:
1) Safety: Abort mission in case of: inability to as-
cend/descend, actuator or propeller problems, leaks,
too deep. Avoid obstacles on the way to the next
waypoint.
2) System preparation: keep away from ship, calibrate
compass, payload on, go to target depth, wait for
continue command.
3) Mission synchronisation: go to surface if commanded,
update waypoints if commanded acoustically by the
operator or if updated by an on-board algorithm mon-
itoring sensor data.
4) Mission execution: go to next way point until all
waypoints are visited.
5) Mission finalisation: turn payload off and go to surface
The corresponding design can be seen in Figure 6. Note
that the overall structure of Figure 5 has been maintained,
with conditions being checked, and actions to satisfy those
conditions being executed when needed, keeping the modular
reactive design, while adding details to the execution. Thus,
the robustness of a well tested safety behaviour is not jeop-
ardised by adding complex details to the mission execution
sub-tree. One could thus keep expanding upon the BT to an
arbitrary level of detail.
As seen above, the modularity of BTs is very convenient
when manually designing a solution given a set of require-
ments. However, this modularity is also very important for
automatic synthesis of BTs using planning tools [21] or
machine learning [10], [11].
V. EXAMPLE EXECUTIONS
To illustrate the functionality of the proposed BT, we de-
scribe some sample mission executions. Suppose the AUV is
submerged in proximity to the ship, as would be expected in
the nominal mission scenario; this would yield the following
condition checks and action executions: (but note that each
number in the list below can correspond to one or arbitrarily
many ticks, depending on how long the operation takes)
1) Mission not aborted, able to ascend/descend, actuator
and prop are operational, there aren’t any leaks, and
not over depth, so don’t drop weight and go to surface
(note that this condition is continuously checked).
2) Not away from ship, so transit away from ship.
3) Now away from ship, wait for go command.
4) Go command received, so stop waiting!
5) Is the compass calibrated? No, so calibrate it!
6) Compass is now calibrated, check if the payload is
powered on.
7) Payload is now powered on, check if at target depth.
8) Not at target depth, so go to target depth.
9) Now at target depth, wait for the continue commands.
10) Received continue command, so stop waiting!
11) No commands to surface, so don’t surface.
12) No user commanded waypoints, so don’t update way-
points.
13) No waypoints received from autonomy, so don’t update
way points.
14) All waypoints not visited, so check position.
15) Not at target waypoint, so go to target way point.
Ø →
?
→
mission	not	aborted
able	to	descend
actuator	operational
prop	operational
no	leaks
depth	okay
→
set	mission	abort
drop	weight
go	to	surface
?
path	obstacle	free
avoid	obstacles
?
continue	command	received
→
?
away	from	ship
keep	distance
?
go	command	received
wait	for	go
?
compass	calibrated
calibrate	compass
?
payload	on
turn	on	payload
?
at	target	depth
adjust	depth
?
continue	command	received
wait	for	continue
?
mission	synchronised
→
?
no	go	to	surface
go	to	surface
?
no	commanded	waypoints
update	commanded	waypoints
?
no	autonomy	waypoints
update	autonomy	waypoints
?
mission	complete
→
?
at	target	waypoint
go	to	target	waypoint
update	target	waypoint
?
mission	done
→
?
at	surface
go	to	surface
?
payload	off
shutdown	payload
Safety	1
Safety	2
System
preperation
Mission
synchronisation
Mission
execution
Mission
finalisation
Fig. 6: AUV mission BT with the same overall structure as
Figure 5.
16) Now at target waypoint, so assign new target as next
way point.
17) Not at the new target waypoint, so go to it.
18) New waypoints received from either the operator or
on-board autonomy, so updated waypoints.
19) Keep following new waypoints.
20) Eventually at terminal waypoint (mission complete),
check if at surface.
21) Not at surface, so go to surface.
22) Now at surface, so check if payload is off.
23) Payload is not off, so shut it down.
24) Mission is now finalised.
Now consider a scenario in which a critical condition is
encountered during the course of the mission execution:
1) Mission not aborted, able to ascend/descend, actuator
and prop are operational, there aren’t any leaks, and
not over depth, so don’t drop weight and go to surface.
2) ...
15) Not at target waypoint, so go to target way point.
16) Still able to ascend/descend, actuator and prop are
operational, but there is a leak! Set Mission Abort to
TRUE. Drop weight and go to surface.
17) Leak might stop due to reduced pressure, but Mission
abort is still TRUE, so continue to surface.
18) Stay at surface until picked up.
As can be seen above, the proposed controller results in a
reactive and fault-tolerant mission execution. Furthermore,
the resulting AUV mission specific BT retains the high level
functionality described by the general mission critical system
BT in Figure 5.
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper we have demonstrated that the BT framework
is an advantageous approach for controlling mission critical
systems. We have shown the sequence of steps one can
take in order to transcribe the given system and mission
requirements in a succinct, modular, and convenient manner,
proceeding from a general design as shown in Figure 5 to a
specific design in Figure 6.
With respect to safety, we have demonstrated that we are
able to invoke safety checks with high precedence using node
priority. We are able to ensure that at every moment in time
the BT monitors the system’s safety before proceeding to
other subsequent tasks.
With respect to modularity, we have demonstrated that,
although there may be several behaviours that share mutual
conditions and/or actions, single nodes can be implemented
in a decentralised manner among several behaviours, elimi-
nating the need for unnecessary code replication. Further-
more, because of this modularity, it is easy to see that
behaviour trees can be described at varying levels of detail,
as we have done in this paper whilst transitioning from the
general BT in Figure 5 to the specific one in Figure 6. Finally,
subtrees can be inserted or removed without changing the
overall structure of the tree.
With respect to versatility, we have demonstrated that
several different sub tasks can be accomplished in order
of priority by being encapsulated into a single BT. This
encapsulation delegates between tasks, and ensures that the
control system can flexibly handle switching between the
variety of tasks needed to be subsequently satisfied.
Lastly, with respect to robustness, we have demonstrated
that, by using the PPA behaviour structure [15], as we do
throughout this paper, we can always ensure that controls
are being chosen with priority of goal fulfilment in mind. In
the case of the BT in Figure 6, at the overall level behaviours
are being executed to ultimately achieve mission finalisation,
which requires the successful completion of all previous
nodes in the main sequence.
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